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The Palestinian-Israeli-American marathon meetings of July 2000
provided the topic (“Camp David 2000: What Went Wrong?
Lessons for the Future”) for a three-day conference at Tel Aviv
University, organized jointly by Tel Aviv University and al-Quds
University, and funded by the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation. All
of the Camp David negotiators were invited to participate. Some
excused themselves for not being able to participate, like the
former US president Bill Clinton, who did send, however, a small
written message to the conference; others had to apologize, like
the Palestinian President Yasir Arafat, whose participation via
video-conferencing (as suggested by the organizers) was rejected
by both Israel and the United States. Nevertheless, many accepted
the invitation, from the former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
and American negotiators Martin Indyk and Robert Malley to
Palestinian negotiators Saeb Erekat, Hassan Asfour, and
Mohammad Dahlan. In the end, though, there were very few
Palestinian participants, among them only one Camp David
veteran (Samih al-Abed). Most of the major players were probably
busy negotiating the Intifada cease-fire, while others, notably
Hassan Asfour, were simply refused passage at Israeli army
checkpoints. Sari Nusseibeh, however, president of al-Quds
University, could and did attend, and participated in the opening
of the conference, side by side with Itamar Rabinovich, president
of Tel Aviv University.
This international conference obviously reflects the ongoing
intense academic and scholarly interest in the second Camp David
Summit of July 2000, as does the astonishing amount of academic
writing, already published or about to be published, on myriads
of topics associated with it.
Until this very day, both Israelis and Palestinians have to live
under the consequences of Camp David, from al-Aqsa Intifada to
the re-occupation of all of the West Bank (and large parts of the
Gaza Strip), the demise of the Oslo Process and the whole system
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built on it. From the de-legitimization of the Palestinian leadership
with the focus on President Yasir Arafat and putting him under
siege, to the attempt and then the execution of a ‘white’ regime-
change in Palestine by means of the creation of the office of Prime
Minister and the nomination of Mahmud Abbas to this office. All
these events are direct consequences of Camp David. My brief
introduction shows that there are two major reasons, two lines of
motivation, to deal with Camp David:
An academic one: studying Camp David as a historian or
as a political scientist, focusing on the central historical
question of what actually happened in Camp David, or
on questions emanating from Political Science like the
lessons of Camp David, the interests of the parties in Camp
David, or on much narrower issues dealing with methods
of negotiation etc.
A more narrowly political and strategic one: posing
questions on the political and strategic results of Camp
David, one that works on the hypothetical question of
what would or could have happened if Camp David had
ended differently, or the simple and yet so difficult
question of whether the course of events after Camp David
was open or predetermined.
My point has become clear I think. Camp David is an overdue
topic for a conference not only in Tel Aviv, but obviously also in
Birzeit, where the debate on this crucial summit should be re-
opened sooner rather than later. In my paper today, however, I
have a much more modest goal. First, I want to try and establish,
based on a summary review of the literature (both primary and
secondary materials), what actually happened at Camp David,
with a clear focus on the Palestinian narrative. Then, I want to
follow in some detail Bill Clinton’s and Ehud Barak’s spin on the
events and results of Camp David right after the conference,
resulting in the creation of the Myth of Camp David, and analyze
its formidable consequences, some of which we all are suffering
Helga Baumgarten
9
from today. Last but not least, I want to look at the attempts to
counter this story and myth, as undertaken above all by
Palestinians, in the first place the Palestinian Authority (the
Negotiation Department) and the negotiators in Camp David (first
and foremost Akram Haniyeh), in addition to the few Americans’
stands (Robert Malley with Hussein Agha and Deborah Sontag),
who played a crucial role in this respect. The conclusion will be
the main “strategic” part of my paper and present the basis for the
discussion by posing one central question:
Was there a chance for the Palestinians, with or without the help
of outsiders, to effectively counter the Myth of Camp David,
perhaps even to prevent it from exerting such a formidable impact
on political developments thereafter? In other words, in fact, I am
trying here to provoke a discussion of the role of myth creation,
and of the media in major international conflicts.
I. What happened in Camp David?
There are no official Camp David II documents. During the whole
conference practically no papers were produced, and there is no
written protocol. All the negotiations were done on the basis of
positions conveyed orally, with no documentation or protocol of
results or diverging positions. What we do have, however, as a
source is a whole array of - sometimes more, sometimes less
conflicting - personal accounts of most of the participants, both
in written (books and articles) and oral (interviews and
presentations during conferences) forms.1 In addition to that, many
articles and at least one book were written by political activists,
journalists, researchers and academics on Camp David.
1
 I used mainly Malley/Agha 2001 and 2002, Deborah Sontag 2001, Akram Hanieh
2000, Shlomo Ben Ami 2001 and 2002, Ehud Barak 2002 a and b, and the first
book written on Camp David by Charles Enderlin 2002, see bibliography at the
end of the paper.
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So, the first problem is to try and find out what actually happened
in Camp David, i.e. the classic task of the historian as defined by
the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), namely
“simply to show, what actually has happened”. The fact that three
years have passed since Camp David and the availability of both
source material and analyses published in the meantime has made
this task much easier.
I.1. The Basic and Principled Palestinian
Position in Camp David II
The Palestinian leadership, and Palestinian society at large, had a
clear vision of the outcome of the Oslo Process, namely the end
of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip and the establishment of an independent, sovereign
Palestinian state in this very area from which the Israeli army had
to withdraw and from where Israeli settlements had to be removed,
with East-Jerusalem as its capital. This vision went back not to
the beginning of the Oslo Process, but to the Palestinian
Declaration of Independence in 1988, when the Palestinian
National Council renounced its demand for the return of all of
historical Palestine and agreed on a political solution based on
peaceful coexistence with the State of Israel, as it had been created
in 1948. The point of reference for this demand in the Oslo
documents was UNSCR 242 with the principle it enshrined,
namely land for peace, to be interpreted in the Palestinian case to
land, on which a Palestinian state was to be established, in return
for peace for both sides, Israel, which hoped to achieve security
based on peace, and the future Palestinian State and its citizens.
For the Palestinian negotiators, therefore, the question was simply
when the Israeli side would be ready to accept these demands which
they considered to be based on international legitimacy. To put it
differently, the Palestinians came to Camp David on the basis of
the perception and assumption that their major compromise had
been made in 1988 and in Oslo in 1993, when they recognized the
existence of Israel, in the borders of June 1, 1967. Now, or so they
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thought, it was the turn of the Israeli side to make the necessary
compromises to reach an agreement on the final status issues,
starting with the question of the borders, i.e. the borders of June 4,
1967 for the Palestinians, moving to the question of Jerusalem,
i.e. East Jerusalem as the capital of the future State of Palestine,
and ending with the question of the refugees, i.e. the recognition
of the right of return as enshrined in UNR 194.2
I.2. Israeli Positions in Camp David and
Palestinian Reactions
The Israeli position could not have differed more from these
expectations. It seems that the Palestinians were aware of this;
Yasir Arafat was trying by every means to postpone the summit
as proposed by Ehud Barak, at least until August, in order to allow
for more preparatory rounds of negotiation.3 Ehud Barak, however,
needed this summit in order to save his political career, or so he
thought. According to his reading of the situation, there was a
distinct possibility to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians
acceptable to Israel if only it could be imposed on the Palestinians.
In Barak’s calculation, Arafat simply had to be cornered and driven
to the point were he would sign the treaty as proposed to him.4
What were Barak’s proposals? I want to focus here on the
major and decisive proposals, the envisaged borderline
between Israel and the future Palestinian state, Jerusalem and
the refugees question.
2
 Summary of Palestinian Positions, available at www.nad-plo.org/permanent/
sumpalpo/htm., accessed on July 31, 2003. As background reading see Yezid
Sayigh 1997: Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National
Movement, 1949-1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press, and Helga Baumgarten 1991:
Palaestina. Befreiung in den Staat. Frankfurt a.M.: edition suhrkamp.
3
 Hanieh 2000, Malley 2001, Kimmerling 2003, Enderlin 2002 and others.
4
 Malley 2001, Hanieh 2000, very aggressively also Avnery 2001 and Tanya
Reinhardt 2001a and 2001b.
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1. Borders and Security
Based on the available Israeli, American and Palestinian sources,
Barak and his whole delegation adamantly refused the return to the
June 4, 1967 borders, as envisioned in UNSCR 242. Instead, Barak
proposed at the start of the negotiations to annex part of the West
Bank (starting point was approximately 14 %) in order to have about
80% of all settlers within the borders of an enlarged Israel. At the
same time, he was not ready to consider any exchange of territory for
the land he wanted to annex. For this, Barak received full American
backing. In addition to this, Israel demanded from the Palestinians
part of the border with Jordan, i.e. part of the Jordan Valley, handed
over for a longer period. Taken together, these demands amounted to
an annexation of 24 % or more of the West Bank.5
The next move by Barak entailed a second Israeli offer, transmitted
to the Palestinians via Clinton, which became the standard
mechanism in Camp David throughout the summit: annexation
of only 10,1% of the West Bank plus Israeli demands on the border
with Jordan.6
After a brief retreat by the Israelis on July 18, which led them
back to demand once again an annexation of at least 12 % of the
West Bank, Barak, at the start of the second week, began to move
away from these demands which clearly crossed all Palestinian
red lines. Now the talks focused on 9 % annexation with 1%
exchange of territory given to the Palestinians in the vicinity of
the Gaza Strip.7
This was as far as Barak moved at any given moment in Camp
David: 91% of the West Bank given to the Palestinians, who would
receive the amount of 1% of West Bank land in the Gaza area and
thus gain an enlarged Gaza Strip, plus the demands in the Jordan
5
 Enderlin 2002:204, July 15, Israeli map
6
 Enderlin 2002:214, July 16
7
 Enderlin 2002, also other references quoted in footnote 1.
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Valley, where, at one point, Israel showed readiness to accept an
international force instead of an Israeli military presence.
In addition to this, we have to consider the various Israeli demands
in the context of preserving their security, i.e. three early warning
stations in the West Bank to be manned by Israeli soldiers, Israeli
control over Palestinian air space, Palestinian agreement to Israeli
army deployment in the West Bank in case of an emergency
(without this emergency being clearly defined), Israeli presence
at Palestinian border crossings in order to verify Palestinian
demilitarization and special security arrangements along the border
with Jordan including Israeli de facto annexation of 10 % of the
land along this border. This would have left the Palestinians, at
the time of the best Israeli offer, with no more than 82% of the
West Bank as the basis for their state.
2. Jerusalem
There is agreement among most sources that Jerusalem was the
major subject of discussion during the Camp David Summit.8
The Palestinian position was clear from the start: East Jerusalem
had been occupied in 1967 and Israel was obliged, based on
UNSCR 242, to withdraw from there. Palestinians were ready to
make far-reaching concessions based on this principled starting
point in terms of accepting Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish
quarter and over the Wailing Wall, the Kotel, as well as acceptance
of Israeli sovereignty over most of the newly created Israeli
settlements in East Jerusalem after 1967, with the exception of
Jabal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud.9
8
 For example Moshe Amirav, Haaretz 9.12.2002, p.4: “The Camp David summit
became a ‘Jerusalem summit’, perhaps even a ‘Temple Mount summit’.” See
also Ben Ami 2001 and 2002, Enderlin 2002, Hanieh 2000 etc.
9
 Explicitly in Amirav 2002 ibid., Enderlin 2002, Haniyeh 2000, Ben Ami 2001,
Malley/Agha 2001.
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The Israeli delegation again adamantly opposed this Palestinian
starting position. For them, Jerusalem was the united capital of
the State of Israel, and there was no readiness to relinquish
sovereignty over it, except for tiny portions, i.e. at most the
outlying suburbs of Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, there was some movement from this original Israeli
position as formulated by Barak. Shlomo Ben Ami presented the
most far-reaching Israeli offer on July 24 in the last meeting with
the Palestinians, presided over by Bill Clinton.10
The exterior suburbs, like Beit Hanina for example, would fall
under Palestinian sovereignty; in the interior circle, one or at the
most two quarters would come under Palestinian sovereignty
and the rest would receive only limited sovereignty. For the Old
City, a special regime was proposed for the Muslim, Christian
and Armenian quarters, together with joint security in the Old
City. A previous offer, put on the table by Barak, that the Muslim
and Christian quarters would fall under Palestinian sovereignty
and the Armenian and the Jewish quarters under Israeli
sovereignty, was subsequently withdrawn, even upon
intervention by Clinton, who wanted to put it back on the table.
There was to be a seat for the Palestinian government under
Palestinian sovereignty inside the Old City.
Al-Haram ash-Sharif was to be put under Palestinian custodianship
with the presence of Palestinian security, but under Israeli residual
sovereignty, in addition to the granting Israel a place in al-Haram
terrace where Jews could pray.11
The Palestinian counter-offer, as presented by Saeb Erekat, ceded
the Jewish quarter as well as the Wailing Wall, the Kotel, to Israeli
10
 Enderlin 2002, see Ben Ami himself 2001, see Amirav in Haaretz 9.12.2002,
p.4. Also forthcoming book by Menahem Klein 2003, as well as Klein 2003
in Haaretz.
11
 Details on this in Amirav 2002.
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sovereignty. In addition, the Palestinians were ready to concede
Israeli sovereignty over the new settlements in East Jerusalem in
exchange for land elsewhere.12
3. Refugees
On the refugees issue, almost nothing was achieved and no far-
reaching concessions by either side were reported, other than the
positions already held before the summit.
Israel adamantly opposed to accepting any responsibility for the
‘birth of the Palestinian refugees problem’, to quote the title of
Benny Morris’ groundbreaking study of 1987, and was not ready
to accept the right of return as enshrined in UNR 194. Barak was
adamant on this issue.
The Palestinians, however, insisted on an Israeli declaration
assuming responsibility for causing this problem. In addition, they
demanded Israel’s acceptance, in principle, of the right of return.
In terms of a practical implementation of the right of return, there
was a high degree of flexibility on the part of the Palestinians.
Israel, as formulated at one point by Elyakim Rubinstein, declared
itself ready to accept a limited number of refugees into Israel, spread
over a period of many years.13 Palestinians were ready to move in
this respect.14 At least informally, Mohammad Rashid mentioned
to Gilad Sher that Palestinians needed a quick solution for the
Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon by way of compensation
and resettlement in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which
would be evacuated by Israel. Arafat assured, in addition to that,
that no demographic problem would be resulting for Israel from its
flexibility in this point, i.e. there would not be huge numbers of
12
 Enderlin 2002, Malley/Agha 2000.
13
 Malley/Agha 2000, Ben Ami 2001, Enderlin 2002.
14
 Enderlin 2002.
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Palestinians returning to Israel. This reassurance was repeated by
Arafat in an op-ed in the New York Times in 2002.15
I.3. Summary of Camp David Negotiations
A short summary seems in place here. Israel under the leadership
of Ehud Barak had the following to offer for the Palestinians:
1- Concerning borders: 81% of the West Bank plus the whole
of the Gaza Strip, to be enlarged by land exchanged for
1% of West Bank territory.
To put it differently, Israel insisted on the annexation of
9% of the West Bank, in addition to a de facto annexation
of another 10% of land in the Jordan Valley. It was prepared
to exchange 1 % of West Bank land for an equivalent area
adjacent to the Gaza Strip, to be added to it.
2- Concerning Jerusalem: Palestinian sovereignty over the
exterior Palestinian suburbs (like Beit Hanina) and over
one or two of the Palestinian quarters in the so-called
inner circle (like Wadi Joz or Sheikh Jarrah, for example),
as well as a seat for the Palestinian government in the
Old City. The Muslim, Christian and Armenian Quarters
were to be put under a special regime. Palestinians were
to be given custodianship over al Haram ash-Sharif, which
would, however, remain under Israeli “residual”
sovereignty. Palestinians were asked to give space to Jews
for prayer in the al-Haram ash-Sharif area. Jerusalem as
a whole was to remain under Israeli sovereignty.
To put it differently, while conceding sovereignty over
some Palestinian quarters in East Jerusalem, as well as a
seat for the Palestinian government, Israel insisted on
15
 Malley/Agha 2002, Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud
Barak), p.2. www.nybooks.com/articles/15502, accessed on August 1, 2003.
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keeping sovereignty over Jerusalem as a whole including
al-Haram ash-Sharif. In a clear change of the accepted
status quo, Israel demanded space for Jews to pray inside
al-Haram area.
3- Concerning Refugees: There was nothing one could call
an offer made by the Israeli side, except for the possibility
to have a limited number of refugees over a designated
period of time allowed into Israel.
Palestinians in turn, insisted on the following positions:
1- Concerning borders: recognition of the June 4, 1967 borders
as the starting point for negotiations. Readiness for
territorial exchange on a 1:1 basis for land Israel wanted
to annex in order to keep as many settlers as possible in
place. Readiness to accept some Israeli settlement blocs,
however, only in the actual space they occupy, i.e. without
the surrounding Palestinian communities.
2- Concerning Jerusalem: full Palestinian sovereignty over
East-Jerusalem, ceding, however, to Israel the Jewish
Quarter and the Wailing Wall. There was readiness to
exchange the Israeli settlements built after 1967 in East
Jerusalem for land to be given to the new Palestinian State
elsewhere. There was no readiness to discuss giving up
sovereignty over al-Haram or allowing Jews to pray there,
i.e. changing the status quo in this area.
3- Concerning Refugees: Israeli recognition of its
responsibility for the problem, and recognition of the right
of return according to UNR 194, coupled with readiness
for a pragmatic solution of the application of this right,
with a focus on solving the problem of Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon. Pragmatic for the Palestinians meant
not to cause demographic problems for the State of Israel.
A sober assessment of the summit would conclude that the
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problems were extremely difficult given the demands of both sides.
However, there was a readiness on both sides to move. The main
achievement of Camp David was therefore without doubt that
both sides had started to talk about what had been considered
taboos until then, for both Palestinians and Israelis.
This was precisely the assessment of Palestinian negotiator Saeb
Erekat, who participated in the last round of talks held in Camp
David on July 24 between a Palestinian and an Israeli
representative and presided over by Bill Clinton:
“I propose the publication of a trilateral communiqué which
recognizes and stresses the progress made in Camp David,
underlining that many taboos were broken, but that certain
problems need further negotiations, that the two parties have
decided to continue their negotiations under the supervision of
the United States in order to apply UNSC resolutions 242 and
338 and to reach an agreement in form of a treaty before
September 13, 2000”.16
 In his final address to the two delegations, Clinton very much
followed this assessment when saying: “... I realize that a lot of
progress has been made, that the two sides have advanced. I should
like that both sides continue their negotiations in order to achieve
a treaty in the middle of September”.17
While it was certainly bad enough for all participants in Camp
David that no final agreement had been reached, there still was
enough to build on in the future. The immediate developments
after the summit, however, made any further positive
developments quite unlikely, and only at the end of December,
just before the end of his presidency, Bill Clinton did present his
new ideas, which provided the basis for the following
negotiations in Taba.
16
 Enderlin 2002:256, translated from French.
17
 ibid. 258, translated from French.
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II. The creation of the Myth of Camp David
II.1. Clinton and Barak started the spin right
after Camp David
It was agreed by all parties in Camp David that Bill Clinton would
read the concluding communiqué about the summit conference
to the press. It had also been agreed, before the summit even
started, that there would be no finger-pointing and no blame put
on any party if an agreement was not reached.18
However, things took a different turn immediately after the
summit. In his press conference right at the end of Camp David,
after having read the concluding communiqué agreed upon by
the parties, Bill Clinton put the blame for the failure of the summit
squarely on the Palestinians by accusing them of not having made
any concessions while Barak had risked his whole political career
when he went as far as accepting the division of Jerusalem.
“Prime Minister Barak has taken some very bold decisions,
but we were in the end unable to bridge the gaps. ... We
made progress on all of the core issues. We made really
significant progress on many of them. The Palestinian
teams worked hard on a lot of these areas. But I think it is
fair to say that at this moment in time, maybe because
18
 See Hanieh 2000, Enderlin 2002, Malley/Agha 2001.
Source for Clinton’s promise, that no one would be blamed after a failure, no
finger-pointing:
Malley/Agha, New York Review of Books article, here quoted from JPS121
(autumn 2001), p.67: “A third Palestinian request - volunteered by Clinton, rather
than being demanded by Arafat - was that the U.S. remain neutral in the event
the summit failed and not blame the Palestinians”. On page 68, JPS 121: “Clinton
assured Arafat on the eve of the summit that he would not be blamed if the
summit did not succeed. ‘There will be’, he pledged, ‘no finger-pointing’.”Malley/
Agha, JPS 121, p.70. According to Baruch Kimmerling, based on Ran Edelist’s
book on Barak, the same thing was agreed with the Israelis. Haaretz, April 4,
2003 www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArtEn.jhtml?itemNo=28045.
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they had been preparing for it longer, maybe because they
had thought through it more, that Prime Minister Barak
moved forward more from his initial position than
Chairman Arafat, on - particularly surrounding the
questions of Jerusalem ... My remarks should stand for
themselves ... not so much as a criticism of Chairman
Arafat ... but in praise of Barak. He came there knowing
that he was going to have to take bold steps, and he did it.
And I think you should look at it more as positive toward
him than as a condemnation of the Palestinian side”.19
Ehud Barak also addressed the international press right after the
summit, almost simultaneously with the press conference of
Clinton, and continued the blame game.20
On July 25, the following Key Points were put on the website of
the Israeli Foreign Ministry under the heading ‘Peace Process’:
“Israel came to Camp David ... in order to bring about
an end to the conflict and to secure peace for future
generations. To reach such an agreement, Israel is
prepared to make painful compromises... The positions
presented by Israel ...were well received and were
accorded legitimacy by the US hosts. President Clinton
... praised the flexibility shown by Prime Minister Barak
... The Palestinian leadership showed that it had not
internalized the need to demonstrate flexibility and
compromise... In particular, the positions presented by
Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat with
regard to Jerusalem prevented the achievement of an
agreement ...Some Palestinian circles have intimated
and even declared that they intend to resort to violence
19
 Journal of Palestine Studies (JPS) 117, 2000:156-157.
20
 See quotes in Enderlin 2002:263, full speech on www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/




should the Camp David summit fail.... Israel will do
everything ... to maintain calm and prevent violence”.21
Upon his return to Jerusalem on July 26, Barak made an official
statement on the summit:
“Fifteen days ago, I set out from Jerusalem, the heart
of the Jewish people, on a mission of peace in Camp
David. ...Today I return from Camp David, and can look
into the millions of eyes and say with regret: We have
not yet succeeded. We did not succeed because we did
not find a partner prepared to make decisions on all
issues.... Our Palestinian neighbors have not yet
internalized the fact that in order to achieve peace, each
side has to give up some of their dreams; to give, not
only to demand... We did everything we could. We turned
every stone, we exhausted every possibility to bring an
end to the conflict and a secure future for Israel. And
we continue to hope... To our neighbors, the
Palestinians, I say today: We do not seek conflict. But
if any of you should dare to put us to the test, we will
stand together, strong and determined, convinced in the
justness of our cause in the face of any challenge, and
we shall triumph”.22
It is interesting to note, that in this particular statement Barak
chose to address in particular “my brothers, the pioneering settlers
in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza... my heart is with you in your pain”.
“Also, it should be noted that he made a particular gesture in
deciding to end his declaration with a prayer: “The Lord shall give
strength to His people, the Lord shall bless his people with peace”.23
Two days later, on July 27, Clinton gave an interview to the first
21
 www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hnm0,accessed on August 10, 2003.
22
 (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hnu0 accessed on August 10, 2003.
23
 ibid.
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Israeli TV channel24, qualified by most as “a declaration of
friendship to Israel and a condemnation of Arafat”.25
He proposed to improve the US-Israeli strategic relationship with
increased military and economic aid to Israel, as well as to re-
examine the question of moving the American embassy from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem. At the same time, he warned Arafat and the
Palestinians not to declare a Palestinian state in September for in
this case the US had to re-evaluate its relationship with the
Palestinians.26
Already in the first three days after the end of Camp David, the
spin was working, and a first version of the myth of Camp
David was beginning to become recognizable and to crystallize.
During the Camp David Summit, we were made to believe,
Barak and Israel moved, proving they were ready for peace
with the slogan, which thereafter would be repeated thousands
of times by Barak: “We turned every stone, we exhausted every
possibility to bring an end to the conflict ..”. Arafat and the
Palestinians, however, did not move enough. They were
somehow not ready for peace. Put on a next level of argument,
Barak already stated on July 26: “We did not find a partner”.
On top of it all, Palestinians are now even thinking of unilateral
acts, like declaring an independent Palestinian state on
September 13. They received a clear warning not to do this, for
otherwise the United States would have to reassess its
relationship with the Palestinians. On the other hand, Israel
under its Prime Minister Ehud Barak, was promised a reward
in the form of upgraded strategic relations with the United
States, and a possible move of the American embassy to
Jerusalem: a clear reference here to the readiness of Barak for
compromises in the question of Jerusalem.
24




 JPS 117, 2000:159.
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Also, one day earlier, on July 25, a first hint was made to possible
Palestinian preparations to “resort to violence”, i.e. a first
connection between the failure of Camp David and a Palestinian
preparation for violence. At this point in time, the Israeli warning
is rather couched in general terms focusing on Israel’s intension
to prevent violence.
On the Palestinian side, however, we find only one brief statement
by Arafat, on his way back from the United States to Gaza, after
his meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on July 26:
“The Americans have told us they were ready to continue
negotiations with us. We have decided in Sharm el-Sheikh to
continue negotiations until September 13, the day of independence
for our state with Jerusalem as its capital, if they like it or not.
And who does not like it might just as well drink the waters of the
Dead Sea”.27 Nothing else, no reference to what happened in Camp
David, no taking up of the gauntlet thrown by the US, and even
more so by Israel under Barak.
Arafat’s response to Camp David was rather to visit each and
every foreign political leader, starting in the Arab World and
continuing with Europe and Asia to explain the Palestinian
position in direct talks, without using the international press,
i.e. personal and to a certain degree secret diplomacy instead
of a fight for world public opinion, making use of the very
same media his counterparts in Camp David had introduced
into the conflict.28
However, on this level, too, Barak had been faster and obviously
also more effective, as one can judge from the reception Arafat
received on July 29 in Paris when meeting French President
Jacques Chirac in the Elysee Palace. While the Palestinians took
pains to explain their position and the tremendous compromises
27
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they had been and were ready to make, Chirac’s answer was
unequivocal: “... the American Administration as well as public
opinion inside the United States and in Europe got the feeling,
that Barak took steps ahead while you (the Palestinians) did not
move from your positions”.29
The Palestinian response to the spin and the myth-creation will
be analyzed later on. Here, I want to follow up the spin as it
developed and the further stages in the production of the Camp
David’s Myth.
On August 30, Barak repeated his criticism of Arafat: “We have
yet to hear anything that would indicate openness or flexibility
by P.A. Chairman Yasser Arafat”.30
After the start of the Intifada in fall 2000, Israeli efforts focused
above all on taking up a point already made previously, i.e. the
connection between the Palestinian failure to achieve anything at
the negotiating table and its alleged resolve to resort to violence.
The official Israeli propaganda machine, also followed soon by
the Israeli press, which became more and more garnered to it,
blamed first and foremost Palestinian president Yasir Arafat for
this alleged planning for violence, which, they claimed, had started
right after Camp David.
Already on October 2, 2000, a Cabinet Communiqué announced
that it “holds the PA responsible for the escalation of violence
and the riots”. Moreover, it concludes with a very critical note,
a rather indirect warning: “Those who believe that violence is
an effective tool in the negotiations are mistaken. Violence
cannot replace those difficult decisions without which there will
be no agreement”.31
29
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An article by Ronni Shaked in Yediot Ahronot, placed on the
official government website on October 3, presents an analysis of
the Tanzim, “Fatah’s Fighters on the Ground” and includes this
decisive piece of information and interpretation. On the one hand,
he maintains that the Tanzim stands under the orders of its
commanders, not under the orders of Arafat. At the same time,
however, he continues: “Arafat maintains ongoing links with the
Tanzim’s commanders, finances the organization and uses its
members as a militia in confrontations with Israel, including armed
confrontations. This is why Arafat, to Israel’s disdain, does not
disarm the Tanzim”.32
In a communication to Secretary of State Albright, Barak gives a
clear warning to the Palestinian Authority and to Arafat: “ ... a
cessation of violence is a precondition to further negotiations and
that P.A. Chairman Arafat must choose between proceeding
towards an agreement or sliding into a confrontation for which he
will bear responsibility for the consequences”. In addition, another
slogan was introduced into the debate for the first time: “There
can be no reward for violence”.33 Again, the relation to Camp David
is clear though indirect and implicit:  If the P.A. has not succeeded
in Camp David at the negotiating table, it should not harbor the
illusion of achieving any gains by violence, as Israel will never
“reward” violence.
Another article, also on the Tanzim, is placed on Israel’s official
website on October 6, written by David Schenker from the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He argues along the
same lines as Ronni Shaked, but with a slightly different
interpretation. He starts out for example and puts in unequivocal
terms the relationship between Arafat and the Tanzim, which
Shaked had presented very carefully in all its complexity:
“Tanzim... is the armed wing of Fatah, the largest faction of the
32
 www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i0p0, accessed on August 10, 2003
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PLO, and the one that PA Ra’is Yasir Arafat himself leads... Annual
funding for the Tanzim ...stands at $2.4 million, and is widely
believed to come directly from Arafat”. While the article goes
into some of the complexities of the relationship, the conclusion
is again crystal clear: “... Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe
Yaalon said, ‘The moment he (Arafat) orders the Tanzim to stop
the riots, they will do just that.’”34
The build-up of the argumentation is quite obvious by now. Arafat
failed at Camp David, now he is resorting to violence to achieve
on the street and with the militias, above all the Tanzim, what he
had not been able to achieve on the negotiating table. The
culmination in this argument can be found in an Israeli statement
criticizing the decision of the UN Security Council of October 7,
2000, which had condemned Israel for “the excessive use of force
against Palestinians, resulting in injury and loss of human life”.35
“Israel ... utterly rejects the attempt to place responsibility on Israel
for the violent riots...”36
Then, the Camp David Myth comes into play: “The government
of Israel is acting tirelessly to advance the peace process, while
remaining prepared to make painful concessions”. (part one: Israel
the peace-loving partner, ready for compromises).
“The recent violence is the result of the duplicity and
procrastination which the Palestinian leadership,
headed by Chairman Arafat, has displayed in the peace
process since the Camp David Summit. ... Peace is the
courage to make compromises ...”
The attempt to place the blame for the outbreak of the riots on
34
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alleged Israeli provocation is a cynical attempt by the Palestinians
to deny their direct responsibility for the current violence”. (part
two: Arafat plays a dirty game, is not ready to make compromises
and bears responsibility for the violence). The statement concludes
in blaming the Security Council, “which rewards violence and
undermines the basis of the peace process”.
A decisive turn is taken on October 12, the day two Israeli
soldiers were killed by a mob in Ramallah, with Barak
subsequently ordering the Israeli army to attack PA targets in
Ramallah and Gaza. For the first time, we are confronted here
with a contradiction characterizing Israel’s policy throughout
the Intifada. On the one hand, the PA and Arafat are blamed for
“a loss of control”; on the other hand, instead of having Israel
then strengthening the PA in order for it to be able to regain
control, the exact opposite was being done, i.e. the PA and its
institutions are attacked and the Palestinian infrastructure, above
all in its security aspect, was being destroyed.37 The very first
hint to the possibility that Israel wanted to interfere and work
for a change in the Palestinian leadership can be found on
October 15, in a statement by Barak on the upcoming Sharm el-
Sheikh Summit, when he summarized the positions of Camp
David and accused Arafat of not being able to make the necessary
compromises, ‘necessary’ meaning necessary from the
perspective of Israel’s “vital interests”.
“In the end, we will make peace with the Palestinians, but the
current Palestinian leadership is now showing that it is finding it
very difficult to make the decisions related to an agreement”. The
statement then goes on:
“...Barak noted that the State of Israel’s diplomatic
activity in the last 15 months has ... exposed Arafat’s
unacceptable positions - which demand, in effect, a
return to the 4 June 1967 lines with an exchange of
37
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territories, full control of eastern Jerusalem while
providing for Israeli access to the Jewish Quarter and
the Western Wall, and making no concessions on the
right of return - that no Israeli can accept”.
The story takes on new dimensions and presents a new element
to the myth, the Myth of Camp David and the myth concerning
alleged Palestinian violence in the Intifada, when the Israeli foreign
ministry on October 21 rejects the resolution passed by the UN
General Assembly’s Emergency Session of October 20:
1- “ This decision ignores the fact that the PA planned
and initiated these acts ... The Palestinians, including
the police and Tanzim organization working directly
with the PA, are using live ammunition on all fronts
against Israeli citizens”.
In a second step, the communiqué relates this alleged
pre-planned violence to the Camp David Summit and
the attitudes taken by Israel - in favor of peace - and
the PA -unwilling for peace.
2- “... The Israeli government’s willingness, as
displayed during the Camp David summit, to take
dramatic and painful decisions in order to advance
the peace process, as opposed to the unwillingness
of Arafat and the Palestinian leadership to make the
necessary decisions”.38
Then, we encounter for the first time a new element in the myth
concerning the Intifada, which surpasses everything presented so
far: Palestinians are in fact accused of sending their women and
children into the battle: “...They send women and children to
confront Israelis”.39
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This issue was taken up in a virtual media blitz and achieved
tremendous success worldwide, exemplified by Swedish Queen
Sylvia’s naïve belief in it.
I want to mention and quote here only one additional article,
written by Gerald M. Steinberg, Director of the Program on
Conflict Resolution and Negotiation at Bar Ilan University,
published on October 25 and put on the official Israeli government
website under the title, “Palestinian Child Sacrifice”. The picture
presented there is chilling on the one hand, and unbelievable on
the other for its cynicism, especially confronted with reports from
the ground, as for example given by Amira Hass or Gideon Levy
on the pages of Haaretz.
I want to quote the first passage of the article which all those who
access the website probably focus on:
“According to the Palestinians, over 40 children have
been killed in the waves of violence and confrontations.
They have been killed in the front lines, providing cover
for the armed Palestinian militias with machine guns
and other weapons seeking to overwhelm isolated Israeli
guard posts. The outnumbered Israeli soldiers, defending
the civilians behind these outposts, cannot see the
children through the small slits and openings (as was
clearly the case at the Netzarim crossing in Gaza). The
tragic images of these young victims provide first-rate
propaganda to use against Israel”.
At the end of the article, Steinberg delivers the unavoidable diatribe
against Arafat while trying to put it on a new level of attack:
“When Yassir Arafat was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize, it was not for sending children to be sacrificed as
part of a wider war of terrorism and brutality against
Israel. By revoking his award, the Norwegian prize
committee would reverse some of the damage it caused
in the first place”.
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Here, Arafat for the first time since the signing of the Declaration
of Principles in 1993 was once again called a terrorist, who does
not respect “basic human morality”.40
A first full presentation of the Myth of Camp David in its basic
aspects can be found in a statement made on October 22, 2000,
by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman as a reaction to the Arab
Summit and its decisions taken in Cairo:
“At Camp David, Israel made courageous and far-
reaching proposals in order to achieve a peace
agreement with the Palestinians and an historic
reconciliation with the Arab world. Regrettably, Arafat
and the Palestinians did not respond in any way to these
proposals. Their response was to launch the region into
a whirlpool of violence and bloodshed”.41
A first and rather sober balance sheet is presented by Shai
Feldman, the head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at
Tel Aviv University.42
On the one hand, the basic outlines of the Myth of Camp
David, as it had been developed until then, are repeated as a
matter of fact: According to his assessment, there would have
been no additional Palestinian violence after Sharon’s provocative
entry into al-Haram, had it not been approved by Arafat.
“The Palestinian leader encouraged the continuation
of the violence because he recognized that the clashes
provided him with a golden opportunity to extricate
himself from the difficult position he found himself
confronted with in the immediate aftermath of the Camp
David-II summit. At the summit, Prime Minister Barak
40
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put forward the most conciliatory position ever presented
to the Palestinians by an Israeli leader. The proposal
manifested Barak’s willingness to break long-standing
taboos - primarily, the willingness to re-divide Jerusalem
and to accept a limited return of Palestinian refugees to
Israel proper. In order to do this, Barak sacrificed the
coalition upon which his government rested”.
(This has to be corrected factually, as it is wrong about
the return of refugees and because Barak’s coalition was
finished already before he went to Camp David!).
Interestingly enough, Feldman does concede that “Arafat was also
willing to make considerable concessions in the framework of a
‘permanent status’ agreement, including acceptance that large
settlement blocks would remain under permanent Israeli
sovereignty...” He then goes on to say that:
“in the immediate aftermath of the... summit, President
Clinton... praised Barak profusely for the courage he
demonstrated at the summit. Similarly, European leaders
complimented Israel’s prime minister for his flexibility.
By inference... Arafat was portrayed as responsible for
the failure to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian ‘permanent
status’ agreement”.
After having assessed the overall negative impact of Camp David
and its interpretations in international and regional politics had on
the Palestinians and on Arafat, he provides a first assessment of
Palestinian gains through the Intifada and its media impact:
“ ... The images in the international media of rock-
throwing Palestinian youngsters confronted by armed
Israeli military ... allowed a transformation of the
Palestinian image from being seen as an obstacle to
peace to that of a victim of Israel’s strength. Now, instead
of defending his behavior at Camp David, Arafat could
launch a diplomatic offensive, sending out Palestinian
youth to battle the Israeli military at points of friction
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in order to create the television images he desired,
portraying the Palestinians as the victims of Israeli
occupation and violence”.
It should be noted that the newly created myth of the Palestinian
child sacrifice (only a few days earlier) is immediately taken up
and considerably re-enforced by this sober-sounding assessment
of recent events.
Feldman continues:
“Once the initial gain has been made - with Arafat
successfully escaping the vector of forces against him
in the aftermath of the Camp David-II summit - two
additional objectives were pursued: First, to improve
the Palestinians’ relative position in any further
negotiations by further damaging Israel’s image in the
international community; And second, to attempt to
bring about the ‘internationalization of the conflict’”.
Most illuminating, however, is the balance sheet of gains and losses
Feldman draws at the end of his article, which represents a textbook
case for all those wanting to engage in official media campaigns.
He first summarizes the gains he thinks the Palestinians have made
so far, i.e. until November 2000, the second month of the Intifada:
“The damage inflicted upon Israel’s image abroad” (having
succeeded in persuading Europe and the US “that the
Palestinians were waging a justified effort to end Israeli
occupation while Israel was using excessive force”).
International organizations adopted “resolutions
condemning Israel”, combined with the fact that the
Clinton Administration did not veto UNSCR 1322
condemning Israel.
Achievement of internal Palestinian unity with the
creation of the “Supreme Coordination Committee of the
Islamic and National Forces”.
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“Winning all-Arab support”, with a direct impact on Israel,
when “Morocco, Tunisia and Oman decided to close their
representative offices in Israel and to ask the Israeli
representatives in their countries to leave”.
“The damage they have caused to the Israeli
economy”, in particular, tourism, construction and
agriculture sectors.
However, the decisive result of Feldman’s article is the final
balance sheet he draws and the conclusion he reaches: “The gains
made by the Palestinians are more limited than what initially
appears to be the case and ... most of these gains are short lived
and will likely dissipate with time”.
Here, I want to mention only those aspects related to my topic
here, i.e. Camp David and its consequences.
“Despite the sympathetic resolutions adopted by the UN
and other organizations, Arafat’s efforts to
‘internationalize the conflict’ have so far failed. The
resolutions adopted ... did not include meaningful
operational steps”. Neither the international community
was ready to send an international force into the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, nor there was any sign that it
wanted to impose a solution to the conflict.
“...The most important dimension of Israel’s external
relations - its close ties with the U.S.A.- have remained
largely undamaged. In contrast, the Clinton
administration was frustrated by Palestinian behavior
... In congress, support for Israel remained strong ...
(and) the American press provided much more
balanced commentary than its European
counterparts”.
The conclusion is sobering for the Palestinians and obviously
comes as a relief for Israel in this initial stage of the Intifada:
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“With U.S.-Israel ties unaffected, the Palestinians failed
to change the overall configuration of forces that were
critical of Arafat’s stance in the aftermath of the Camp
David-II summit ...the regional and international
environment of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute remained
unchanged”.
To summarize, Feldman makes use of the Camp David myth in
his analysis, which is submitted as an objective academic analysis,
adding to it the newly created myth of Palestinian “child
sacrifices”.
After Clinton’s presentation of his parameters on 23 December,
2000, Barak had his media advisor clarify the following points:
1- “The state of Israel gave a positive answer in principle to
President Clinton that is conditioned on a positive answer
by the other side”.
2- “If the Palestinians accept ...it will then be possible to
continue the process while adhering to our principle of
No right of return to Israel....
Not to sign any document that transfers sovereignty
over the Temple Mount to the Palestinians”.
At the same time, a warning is attached: A Palestinian rebuttal of
Clinton’s ideas would lead to “increased violence”. “In such a
situation, Israel will take a time-out and prepare for a unilateral
separation ...”43
The story continues with an additional element to the Myth of
Camp David. Barak himself in a telephone conversation with the
US President Clinton, shortly before the end of Clinton’s term in
office, on January 1, 2001, ties Arafat directly to terror. For the
first time, he goes beyond the previous accusation against Arafat
43
 www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ivh0, accessed August 10, 2003.
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in the sense that Arafat encourages violence, but rather accuses
him directly of encouraging terrorism:
“... He has deep doubts about the seriousness of
Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat’s
intention to reach an agreement...”, adding that “Barak
believes that Chairman Arafat intends to work for the
internationalization of the conflict ...by continuing to
encourage terrorism”.44
Here, the stage is set for the final picture Clinton gives of Arafat
and hands on to his successor, George W. Bush, a fatal
development for the Palestinians, but above all for Arafat, as was
proven only little more than one year later in Bush’s June address
on the Palestinian question.45 At the start of the Taba negotiations,
January 21 until January 27, Barak made his positions once again
abundantly clear:
No right of return for the Palestinian refugees.
No relinquishing of sovereignty over the Temple Mount.
Annexation of sufficient land from the West Bank so that
“80% of the Jewish residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza
will be in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty”.46
When the Taba negotiations were suspended in the context of
the Israeli elections, which Barak lost in a landslide to Ariel
Sharon, all of the previous ideas that had been on the table, both
Barak’s or Clinton’s, had become null and void. Barak and
44
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Clinton made it clear that all future negotiations would have to
start from scratch.47
A first full formulation of the by now widely accepted Myth of
Camp David can be found in the articles written by Robert Malley
and Husein Agha as well as by Deborah Sonntag, in the first
international and specifically, American attempt to attack the myth
head-on and present a revisionist version of Camp David.
What did the myth have to say in its version of spring/summer 2001?
In Deborah Sonntag’s words in an article published in the New
York Times on July 26, 2001, i.e. exactly one year after the end of
Camp David in 2000:
“potent, simplistic narrative has taken hold in Israel
and to some extent in the United States. It says: Mr.Barak
offered Mr. Arafat the moon at Camp David last summer.
Mr. Arafat turned it down, and then ‘pushed the button’
and chose the path of violence. The Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is insoluble, at least for the foreseeable future”.
According to her, “many diplomats and officials believe that the
dynamic was far more complex and that Mr. Arafat does not bear
sole responsibility for the breakdown of the peace effort”. She
continues quoting Terje Roed-Larsen, the United States special
envoy in Jerusalem: “It is a terrible myth that Arafat and only
Arafat caused this catastrophic failure. All three parties made
mistakes, and in such complex negotiations, everyone is bound
to. But no one is solely to blame”.48
According to Robert Malley, who participated in the Camp David
Summit as Clinton’s special assistant for Arab-Israel Affairs, and
Hussein Agha, an Arab-American academic and political advisor,
who published the path-breaking feature “Camp David: The
47
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Tragedy of Errors” in the New York Review of Books on August
9, 2001, the myth, which they prefer to name an “orthodoxy”, ran
along the following lines:
“... We often hear about Ehud Barak’s unprecedented
offer and Yasser Arafat’s uncompromising no. Israel is
said to have made a historic, generous proposal, which
the Palestinians, once again seizing the opportunity to
miss an opportunity, turned down. In short, the failure
to reach a final agreement is attributed, without notable
dissent, to Yasser Arafat”.49
The crudest version of the Myth of Camp David, however, was
published approximately one year later, in the pages of the New
York Review of Books, in an interview which Israeli (foremost
revisionist!) historian Benny Morris did with Ehud Barak and in
the following exchange of arguments between Malley and Agha
on the one hand, Barak and Morris on the other. In the words of
the Barak/Morris “team” the myth ran as following:
“And it’s really very simple - Ehud Barak and Bill
Clinton put on the table during July-December 2000 a
historic compromise and the Palestinians rejected it.
...Barak’s offer at Camp David was unprecedented and
... the upgraded (Clinton) proposals offered the
Palestinians 94-96 percent of the West Bank, 100 percent
of the Gaza Strip, a sovereign Palestinian state, an end
to the occupation, the uprooting of most of the
settlements, and sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem
- and Arafat and his aides still rejected the deal and
pressed on with their terroristic onslaught”.50
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Apart from these general outlines of the myth, by then hegemonic,
they added further elements that remained particular to Morris and
Barak and constitute a clearly racist version of the Camp David Myth.
1- According to Barak, Arafat put up in Camp David a
‘performance’ geared to exacting as many concessions as
possible from the Israelis, without ever seriously intending
to reach a peace settlement or sign an ‘end to the conflict’.
This ‘performance’, according to Barak, was based on the
Palestinians’ “and especially Arafat’s mendacity”:
“They are products of a culture in which to tell a lie ...
creates no dissonance. They don’t suffer from the problem
of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth
is seen as an irrelevant category”.51
2- Barak claims that the Palestinians and Arafat in particular,
“believe that Israel ‘has no right to exist, and he seeks its
demise’”. Instead, “Barak believes that Arafat sees the
Palestinian refugees of 1948 and their descendants,
numbering close to four million, as the main demographic-
political tool for subverting the Jewish state”.
3- “The Intifada was preplanned, pre-prepared. I don’t mean
that Arafat knew that on a certain day in September [it would
be unleashed]... It wasn’t accurate, like computer engineering.
But it was definitely on the level of planning, of a grand plan”.
“We know, from hard intelligence, that Arafat (after Camp
David) intended to unleash a violent confrontation, terrorism.
[Sharon’s visit and the riots that followed] fell into his hands
like an excellent excuse, a pretext”.52
I want to move now to the Palestinian reaction to the failure of








III. Palestinian Reactions to the Myth-in-the-Making
Arafat’s focus after Camp David was without doubt the upcoming
date of September 13, the date of, according to the original schedule
of Oslo, the final status talks should have been concluded and a
Palestinian state been established. As dates were not considered
“holy” throughout the Oslo Process, the next possible date for the
establishment of the Palestinian State was September 13, 2000, even
if a year or more late. His statement in Cairo at the end of July, just
back from Camp David, quoted above,53 as well as his world tour
right after Camp David, bears witness to this. The result achieved,
however, was resoundingly negative. There was no support
forthcoming for a unilateral Palestinian state proclamation.54
At the same time, it is hard to understand why there was absolutely
no direct and angry Palestinian response, either in criticism of
Bill Clinton’s press conference right after Camp David, where
the blame-game began, nor in criticism of Ehud Barak, who put
the blame squarely on Arafat when claiming: “Arafat was afraid
to make the historic decisions required at this time in order to
bring about the end of the conflict. Arafat’s positions on the issue
of Jerusalem are what prevented the attainment of an agreement”.55
Even if one accepts the argument that it might not have been a
good idea for Palestinians to criticize Clinton as president of the
U.S.A, surely nobody would have considered it problematic if
Arafat or an official Palestinian statement would have put the
record right for the Palestinian side. Furthermore, certainly nobody
would have criticized the Palestinians if they had answered Barak’s
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It was without doubt a major mistake not to respond here directly
and vehemently. In a sense, the Palestinian side did miss here the
first and probably major opportunity to put a break to the spin and
prevent the myth production before it had been even started. There
are, however, two semi-official Palestinian statements published
not immediately, but only several days after Camp David:
First, the Camp David papers by Akram Haniyeh, serialized in al-
Ayyam, a Ramallah daily he edited, in seven installments between
July 29 and August 10, 2000, the first full personal and authentic
Palestinian account of the Camp David II Summit written by a
member of the Palestinian team in Camp David. This text was
subsequently published as a booklet in both English and Arabic
in August-September 2000.56
Second, there was an Op-Ed by Saeb Erakat in the Washington
Post of August 5, 2000.57
Erakat’s Op-Ed was definitely the better placed and potentially
more influential piece although published with quite a lot of delay
after the end of Camp David. So, I would like to first turn to this
article and its argument.
One would assume that Erakat would take this chance to attack
Barak head-on because of his statement on July 25 at the press
conference right after Camp David. This would have meant
repeating the Palestinians’ absolute commitment to peace, with
all compromises it entailed. However, it would also have stated
the major areas in which their national interest did not allow any
concessions or too many concessions, and finally a critique of
Barak’s precise reference to where he had not advanced far
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enough. Over and above everything, however, it would have
been absolutely essential to attack Barak on his position that all
of what had been proposed in Camp David was now null and
void, i.e. strong criticism of the following statement by Barak:
“Ideas, opinions, and even positions which came up in
the course of the Summit are inapplicable and
unacceptable as an opening point for negotiations, when
these resume. In English, I would say that they are all
invalid”.58
Erakat’s piece is well-argued and leading to a very
convincing climax and conclusion: “What we learned
at Camp David is that the kind of real peace both sides
need will require a little more time, a little more effort
and a little more pain. But we continue to believe that it
is worth the time, effort, and yes, even the pain.
And we know that we can get there”.59 What was missing,
however, was a counter-attack against Barak, not a polite and
considerate statement:
“It is pointless to play the blame game or resort to
prophecies of doom and gloom. No one is at fault
because there was no failure. We made real progress at
Camp David and the imperative now is to build on that
progress and keep the momentum going”.60
While Erakat rightly stressed that both sides made compromises,
he should have pointed out not only where the limit to Palestinian
compromises was, but also where the Israelis had not taken this
into consideration and advanced further in their compromises.
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The comparison between Barak, having to gain parliamentary
majorities, and Arafat, also having to respond to his constituency,
was an important point, but not strong enough nor convincingly
presented.
The worst argument of Erakat, though, was a real self-inflicted
‘goal’. This was all the more the case as this argument dealt with
the very issue the Israeli propaganda machine used as its major
weapon in the spin, i.e. Jerusalem. Erakat was effectively saying
that an agreement with Israel would have been possible if only
the interests of Palestinians had been taken into consideration.
What prevented the agreement, and that is the central message of
this passage, was the interests of two billion Muslims and
Christians. It seems worthwhile to quote in full this most
problematic passage of the whole article:
“On the issue of Jerusalem, in particular, President
Arafat must have an agreement that will be supported
not only by the Palestinian people but also by Arab,
Muslim and Christian communities worldwide who also
are concerned about the future of the holy city. The
interest of 8 million Palestinians cannot be placed ahead
of the interest of 2 billion Muslims and Christians”.61
Still beyond doubt, it is clear that for the Palestinians, the major
issue now was to continue the negotiations as started in Camp
David, with Saeb Erakat clearly being the main proponent of
this view. He took up renewed negotiations with his Israeli
counterparts two days after Camp David and continued them
almost non-stop until September.62 In one of these interviews,
he made a clear statement concerning Jerusalem, which,
however, was not published at the time. Answering the question:








over the mosques and East Jerusalem?”, he said quite openly:
“I don’t think so”.63
I shall now turn to Akram Hanieh’s Camp David Papers.
The papers were published in seven separate installments. In the
first one, under the heading “The Road to the Summit”, the
preparatory phase of Camp David is described and analyzed,
counter-posing the different positions of the Palestinians, who had
argued, “that conditions were not yet ripe for holding a summit”.64
The Israeli and US positions pushed for the summit and the
Palestinians finally accepted, hoping “Clinton would not attempt
to impose what the Palestinians reject”.65 In the second paper, the
arrival of the two delegations to Camp David is described and the
“rules of the game” are presented with an interesting focus on the
fact “that the Israeli delegation was deliberately leaking a lot of
news”, i.e. a clear awareness of the enormous importance the Israelis
gave to the media and to the shaping of public opinion. The third
paper is a clear criticism of Clinton, who failed to be the “honest
broker” the Palestinians wanted him to be, while he instead chose
to act in the context of a “united Israeli-American delegation”,
putting pressure only on the Palestinians.66 The fourth paper
delineates the Israeli position, seen from the perspective of the
Palestinians and starts out with Arafat’s quotation: “They are not
ready for peace”.67 It continues to summarize the perceived Israeli
position: “The Israelis came to Camp David with their mythology,
arrogance of power, and the mosaic of their internal politics”.68 ...
“The plan was to close the Palestinian deal at the lowest price”.
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American and Israeli team) needed several days ... to realize what
it meant to face the man named Yasser Arafat”.69 The fifth paper
summarizes the ongoing negotiations, with a focus on Jerusalem.
The sixth paper follows the developments at Camp David after
Clinton succeeded in bridging over the premature failure and ending
the summit closure. Finally, the last paper, presents the overall
Palestinian position and assessment, starting with the title for the
paper: “Areas of Failure ... Boundaries of ‘Accomplishment’”.70 It
summarizes the last offers presented to the Palestinians by Clinton
and the Palestinian rejection. It ends with the focus once again on
Jerusalem, put this time in the mouth of an American/Pakistani taxi
driver: “Don’t surrender Jerusalem!”.71
Obviously, Hanieh’s “Camp David Papers” are above all a very
pointed and polemical account on what happened during the summit
from a Palestinian perspective. It was certainly an excellent way to
inform the Palestinian public about what had gone on in the secrecy
of Camp David. In that respect, the role of the Palestinian leadership,
of the negotiating and expert teams was depicted in fervent colors,
making every single Palestinian proud of them.
On the other hand, however, it was far from being a well-
conceived counter-attack in the press with the aim of neutralizing
Israeli propaganda concerning Camp David, if not actually
putting the record straight and forcefully and aggressively
presenting the Palestinian reading of the situation, i.e. stressing
the Palestinian commitment to peace and to a two-state solution,
while at the same time making clear what the Palestinian red
lines were and why. Also, it did not even attempt to show clearly
and convincingly what the Israelis had started to do after Camp









The papers ended with the departure of the Palestinians from
Camp David and from the USA.
Last but not least, there was no special effort made to show the
Palestinians’ absolute commitment to advancing the Peace Process,
a commitment which did not allow any descending to the level of
blame-games, a tactic which was well in the reach of the Palestinians
and which they could have used against the Israeli media blitz.
Over and above everything, however, the articles and the booklet
remained something for insiders. They never made any headway
in the international press. Most people, internationally and even
in Palestine/Israel, never heard about these articles. The headlines
were made by Barak’s and Clinton’s Camp David story. Before
attempting a final interpretation of the Palestinian dealing with
the production of the Myth of Camp David, I want to continue
the search for other statements and actions on the Palestinian side.
I shall start with statements and speeches by the Palestinian official
leadership, and shall then examine some other public Palestinian
statements and analyses, taking as an example some pieces written
by Hanan Ashrawi.
The interview which Mahmud Abbas, thenπ Secretary General
of the PLO Executive Committee, gave to Palestine TV on July
29, two days after Bill Clinton’s interview on the Israeli TV, comes
closest to a first official Palestinian publicized summary statement,
if we disregard Arafat’s brief statement to the press after his return
from Camp David, quoted above.72 Although making clear
important Palestinian positions at Camp David, Abu Mazen’s
statement is above all geared for internal Palestinian consumption,
made in order to achieve internal political gains, not, however, in
72
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any way directed to countering the US/Israeli spin and attempting
to counter the Camp David Myth in the making. On the contrary,
the opening passage, while important for increasing support from
the Palestinian public which had been very suspicious about the
readiness of its leaders for unacceptable compromises, had
potentially the opposite effect on the level of international public
opinion, where it could very well be used to support the Camp
David Myth about the Palestinians’ essentially negative role:
“No human being could withstand the pressure that
President Arafat came under during seventeen days
at Camp David. There was pressure from the strongest
nation in the world, America, and pressure from all
sides to accept certain proposals and ideas. But in
spite of the pressure, we, the humble side, said no when
we saw that the pressure will lead to concessions on
some issues”.73
He explains these issues. However, he could have introduced them
in a different way, making his argument positively, i.e. very much
along the lines of the Israeli arguments focusing on the readiness
to compromise, with a firm statement about the red lines that could
not be crossed.
The problem here seems to be not so much the content of the
statement but rather its form. Also, of course, a statement like this
should have been distributed more widely to the international
press. Above all, the basically positive Palestinian perspective on
Camp David could and should have been used widely: “I consider
the Camp David Summit a success in that it brought an
understanding of all the final status issues among the three sides....
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The next official Palestinian statement was delivered again by Mahmud
Abbas during his speech at the session of the PLO’s Central Council
in Gaza on September 9, 2000. He gave a brief summary to the
members of the council of the result of the negotiations at Camp David
as a basis for their discussion of the issue of postponing the
proclamation of a Palestinian state once again. He exaggerated slightly
the amount of land Israel had proposed to annex during the Camp
David Summit (10, 5% instead of 9% plus 15-20% instead of 10% in
the Jordan Valley as a de facto annexation), but presented both the
Jerusalem negotiations and the refugees question issue quite accurately.
He added, and this seems to be important, that in subsequent
negotiations between the two sides, Israel had shown slightly
more flexibility, especially concerning the return of more
Palestinian refugees.75
He never enters the blame-game, or takes issue with the Camp
David Myth, by then alive and well in its initial form. There is
only one indirect reference to the question of blame, again without
taking a strong position on this delicate and important matter:
“We were faced with two choices, to go (to Camp David)
knowing very well that the summit will fail and that the
Americans may blame us for its failure, or to refuse to
attend and be accused of sabotaging the peace process.
So we took the first choice”.76
For the first time, however, we hear a Palestinian leader who tries
to present the Palestinian position in a positive way:
“We went to Camp David not to say NO to the
Americans and to the world Zionists. We went to say
YES to a lasting and just peace. To say YES to
75
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international legitimacy and when we failed to reach
that, we said No”.77
Abu Mazen’s speech clearly reflects the central Palestinian
concern at the time, i.e. ‘should or should we not declare an
independent state on September 13, 2000’? Under the pressure of
this question they obviously remained quite oblivious to the
tremendous changes in international and regional opinion as they
were brought about by the Barak/Clinton spin.
In a further interview on the Palestine Satellite Channel on
September 19, Mahmud Abbas summarized, for a much wider
audience, what happened at Camp David and what positions the
Palestinians took there. In contrast to previous statements, he
depicted Camp David almost only in negative colors:
“Some negotiators said that understandings on some
issues were reached in Camp David. They also said that
taboos were broken, but I say there was no agreement
on anything and there was no progress recorded”.78
He then, moved on to present the central Palestinian condition for peace:
“When Israel agrees to international legitimacy and to
UN resolutions we will be very happy to sign an
agreement with her. We did not go to Camp David to
sign any agreement at any price. We have the right to
say no”.
At the end of the interview, there was a first, if not very direct
implication, that the Palestinian leadership is aware of the blame-
game and the myth: “Are we now termed as extremists because
we demand the implementing of international relations”?
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“Progress must be made on their part and not by us. They are the
ones who refuse to implement the international resolutions”.
For him, the stage was set then for a Palestinian struggle,
which, as he stressed, “does not necessarily mean that we carry
arms. Our struggle is in holding strong, there are a thousand
ways for saying no. We know the capabilities of the other
side, they have all the power and we have nothing, all what
we have is the faith of our people and that is more important
than any arms”.79
The only official Palestinian proclamation I discovered which
constructed a direct link between Camp David, Sharon’s entry
into al-Haram and the beginning of the Intifada, i.e. in a direct
parallel to Israeli attempts in blaming the Palestinians for precisely
the same thing, is an interview which Abu Mazen gave to Ramallah
newspaper al-Ayyam, on October 10:
“...the latest events which swept the Palestinian
territories, were planned by Israel after the failure of
the July Camp David Summit....after Camp David, Israel
began to fortify settlements and deploy heavy and non-
heavy armor in preparation for some action. Then came
Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Haram al-Sharif compound
...It seems Israel thought it could convince the
Palestinians by force that there is no alternative before
them but to accept surrender, and our answer was that
we reject surrender”.
He concluded the interview with the demanding to send
“international forces to protect Palestinians”.80
Two available major speeches of President Yasir Arafat need to
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In his speech before the Millennium Assembly of the United
Nations on September 6, 2000, Arafat took pains to stress the
Palestinian commitment to peace as well as his readiness for
compromise, especially concerning Jerusalem: “We have made a
strategic decision committing ourselves to the peace process,
offering significant and painful concessions in order to arrive at a
reasonable compromise acceptable to both sides... As for Holy
Jerusalem ... we have agreed to share the city”.
He then, continues with a direct reference to Camp David,
specifically thanking Bill Clinton for his efforts, but thanking
also and at the same time the other sponsors of the Peace
Process, Russia, as well as other powers like the EU, the Arab
countries etc., ending with the commitment: “We shall continue
to do our utmost during the coming short period of time, in
order to arrive at a final settlement between Palestine and Israel,
and we invite the Israeli government to do likewise”.81
However, in the whole speech there is no reference to the
blaming or the myth.
In his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, just one
day after the end of the Taba negotiations, there is no reference
whatsoever either to Clinton’s positions, the Taba negotiations,
the Palestinian input in Taba or the progress achieved there.
What Arafat focused on instead is Israel’s military strategy
against the Palestinians in the Intifada, which he attacked head-
on. In clear contrast to this, he goes on to repeat once again his
and the Palestinians’ commitment to peace, even at the cost of
many concessions:
“... We have made great concessions and sacrifices in order to
achieve comprehensive, just and permanent peace”. He then
appeals, like Abu Mazen before him “to the whole international
community, the United Nations Organization and the vital and
81
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influential international forces, to work for ending this Israeli
war and aggression against our unarmed people...We ask for
the provision of international protection for our people
immediately”.82
What contributions have Palestinian public figures made in
countering the Myth of Camp David? A first opinion would
certainly focus on Hanan Ashrawi, who served as the Palestinian
spokeswoman to Washington during the Camp David talks.
According to Hanieh in his papers, she was sent there as a
counterweight to the Israeli representatives in order to present
the Palestinian point of view in the Israeli media, “to take part in
numerous TV debates to win over American public opinion.
Ashrawi performed very well in them”.83
Hanan Ashrawi’s Miftah website attacked Clinton’s July 27
interview on Israel TV in support of Barak head-on, though with
a considerable delay, in terms of media time.84
“With one full sweep, US President Bill Clinton
succeeded in undermining American standing in the
peace process and throughout the region as an
“even-handed peace broker,” in provoking Arab and
Islamic (as well as Christian) public opinion, and in
undermining the chances for peace in the region.
The notorious Clinton interview on Israeli television
was seen, at best, as peevish and petty, and at worst
as a cynical manipulation of the peace process for
the sake of narrow self-interest and short-term gains.
To the Palestinians it was nothing short of blatant
political blackmail -a thinly-disguised attempt at
coercion and arm-twisting- to bring the Palestinians
82
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to their knees, in other words to compliance with
the Israeli version of realities and of the outcome of
the peace process”.85
Ashrawi too, however, apparently did not perceive the dangers
coming from the Clinton-Barak press-campaign and therefore
did not even attempt to counter the story and the by then almost
fully formulated myth. In an article published two weeks
later,86 she did take on the USA and Israel with a rather cynical
caricature of their policy towards the Palestinians. However,
here too, the focus is above all on the question of a Palestinian
state, not on the problem of the slanted coverage and its
dangerous repercussions in international policy for the
Palestinians.
“Israel, so far and with a great deal of help from its
American strategic ally, seems to have succeeded in
creating an erroneous impression of Israeli “flexibility”
as opposed to Palestinian “intractability” on the
substantive issues-primarily Jerusalem and the
Palestinian refugee question. To be “flexible” (as per
the Israeli-American definition), the Palestinians must
accept a solution that incorporates and perpetuates
multiple injustices”.87
This reaction, clearly more than wanting in face of the media-
blitz and myth, is all the more amazing as Hanan Ashrawi was,
after all, the official Palestinian spokeswoman during the Camp
David Summit, with her headquarters in Washington. Ashrawi is
one of the relatively few people in Palestine with an almost perfect










The Start of al-Aqsa Intifada, the Clinton Parameters and the
Taba Conference.
After the Second Intifada, better known as al-Aqsa Intifada, had
started at the end of September/beginning of October, Palestinians
focused on only two things: the Intifada on the one hand and the
on-going negotiations with the Israelis on the other. These
negotiations led to two more climaxes: the publication of the so-
called Clinton parameters on December 23, and the Israeli-
Palestinian bilateral negotiations in Taba between January 21 and
January 27. At the end of the Taba negotiations, a joint statement
was issued saying that substantial progress had been achieved on
all issues. The hope was expressed that negotiations would resume
after Israeli elections to be held on February 6. Both represented
a significant advance compared to the Camp David Summit,
especially concerning the demands of the Palestinians.
While in Camp David, the maximum Israeli offer had consisted
of 91% of the West Bank, Clinton88 proposed a return of 94 to
96% of the West Bank to the Palestinians, together with a
compensation “equivalent to 1-3% of territories annexed”.89 In
Jerusalem, including the Old City, there was to be a division of
sovereignty according to Arab and Israeli quarters (“Arab areas
are Palestinian and ... Jewish areas are Israeli”90). Concerning al-
Haram, he proposed Palestinian sovereignty over it and Israeli
sovereignty over the Western Wall, with a mutually agreed upon
solution concerning excavations under al-Haram. On the refugees
question, he summarized the Israel and Palestinian conflicting
positions and proposed a solution along the lines that a return to
historic Palestine or a return to their homeland would be
recognized in principle, while practically speaking a solution had
to be found for the implementation of this right, mainly in the
88
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future Palestinian State, but with some refugees allowed into Israel,
according to Israeli agreement.
In his speech on January 7, 2001, Clinton announced: “Both Prime
Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat have now accepted these
parameters as the basis for further efforts. Both have expressed some
reservations”.91 Barak accepted almost immediately, while Arafat
came forth with the Palestinian acceptance only on January 3, 2001.92
Based on these proposals, the negotiations in Taba were started,
marking a further progress towards a possible agreement.
At the conclusion of these talks, which were stopped by Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak because of the approaching Israeli elections,
a joint communiqué was published by the negotiating partners:
“The Taba talks conclude an extensive phase in the
Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations with
a sense of having succeeded in rebuilding trust between
the sides and with the notion that they were never closer
in reaching an agreement between them than today.... It
is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could
be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following
the Israeli elections”.93
As to the Taba talks, in contrast to the Camp David Summit, the
researcher does have available a compilation of the negotiations, the
different positions, the results achieved and the gaps remaining. This
compilation, the so-called Moratinos non-paper,94 was written by
Miguel Moratinos, the special envoy of the European Union to the
91
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Middle East, at the request of the two parties. His report is based on
interviews with the negotiators directly after the different sessions.
“The final document ... was completed and approved by both sides in
the summer of 2001... The document, which was not to be published,
was leaked and published by Haaretz on 14 February 2002”.95 Also,
through a publication in Le Monde Diplomatique from September 2001,
we have the position papers of both negotiating partners available.
Where did the two sides reach at the end of January 2001, i.e. half a
year after Camp David, one month after the publication of the Clinton
parameters, and at the end of the fourth month of al-Aqsa Intifada?
Concerning borders, for the first time both sides agreed specifically
on the borders of June 4, 1967, as the basis for the future borders.
There was disagreement between both sides on the amount of
land Israel wanted to annex in order to accommodate 80% of Israeli
settlers. The Palestinians, based on their map, offered “3.1% in
the context of a land swap”, the Israeli side presented a map with
“6% annexation, the outer limit of the Clinton proposal”. As to
the amount of land swap, “the Israeli side adhered to a maximum
3% land swap as per (the) Clinton proposal”.96
As to the Gaza Strip, “it was implied that ... (it) will be under total
Palestinian sovereignty... All settlements will be evacuated”.97
As to Jerusalem, “both sides accepted in principle the Clinton
suggestion of having Palestinian sovereignty over Arab
neighborhoods and Israeli sovereignty over Jewish
neighborhoods”.98 The Palestinians were ready to discuss granting
Israeli sovereignty over the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem,
with the exception of Jabal Abu-Ghunaym and Ras al-Amud, while
rejecting it over Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Zeev. Palestinians
95
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were supposed to receive sovereignty over part of the Old City,
while they were ready to grant Israel sovereignty over the Jewish
Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter.
As to the Holy Sites, both sides “accepted the principle of respective
control over each side’s respective holy sites”, however only in
terms of religious control of management. Palestinians accepted
in principle Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall, with disputes
remaining as to its precise delineation.99 The question of al Haram
ash-Sharif (the Temple Mount) was not solved, with both sides
being “close to accepting Clinton’s ideas regarding Palestinian
sovereignty over al-Haram ash-Sharif”.100
As to the Refugees Question, non-papers were exchanged as a
basis for the talks. Talks focused on a “joint narrative for the
tragedy of the Palestinian refugees”, with “much progress”
achieved.101 The question of return was discussed, with the Israeli
side proposing accepting a limited number of refugees, about
25,000 in the first three years, as stated in their non-paper. The
question of compensation was also raised.
As mentioned in part I, after Barak’s defeat in the Israeli elections,
all the achievements of Camp David, the Clinton parameters and
Taba were considered null and void, non-binding to any future
Israeli government. According to Barak and Clinton, every future
effort to achieve a peace agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians is supposed to start from scratch.
Again, like after Camp David and the immediate production of the
Myth of Camp David, the question imposes itself about the lack of a
Palestinian effective and strong revisionist effort to reach world









it differently, why did not the Palestinians start their counter attack
at least then, i.e. right after Taba or the latest after the Israeli elections
in February or March 2001? Why did not they make a strong stand
against the myth which had by then started to dominate public
discourse worldwide, and which had above all begun to determine
the political stands taken by the world’s leaders, not only the new
American leadership, but also the different European leaders? Why
was it left for Americans like Robert Malley and Hussein Agha on
the one hand, and Deborah Sonntag on the other, to start confronting
the myth and presenting a revisionist version of Camp David? In
addition, why did this intervention also come one whole year late?
Before trying to answer this question, a short examination of the
activities of the Palestinian negotiating team in terms of public
relations activities seems in place.
In their assessment of the Clinton Administration’s involvement
in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process, the PLO negotiating team
clearly had a chance to enter the debate on Camp David on January
22, 2001.102 They opted instead for a sober and basically
pessimistic summary of what had gone wrong as a result of
political options they argued were chosen by the US, above all
the option for “process over substance”, for “normalization before
an end to the occupation of Arab lands”, for “the adoption of an
Israeli perspective” over “acting as an honest broker”, and finally
the option for “US/Israeli domestic political concerns” which then
“overrode the goal of a lasting peace”. Particular criticism was
reserved for US Middle East coordinator Dennis Ross because of
his “emotional commitment to Israel” and his inability “to
distinguish between (his) personal and professional involvement
with it”. No mention can be found of the spin put in motion by
Clinton and Barak right after Camp David, nor of the step-by-
step production of a myth of the summit, which became more
vitriolic in every new manifestation.
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On the website of the Negotiations Affairs Department, however,
there is one single exception, which seems to have led to some, if
belated, consequences drawn by the Palestinian negotiators and
resulted in concrete actions.
On March 7, 2001, the former special assistant to Bill Clinton for
Arab-Israel affairs, Robert Malley, gave a briefing at the
Palestinian Center for Policy Analysis in Ramallah, chaired by
Khalil Shikaki, which is quoted in some detail on the website of
the Negotiations Affairs Department:
“There is a ‘ferocious battle’ going on between Israel
and the Palestinians, as to ‘conflicting interpretations
of what happened’ during the Oslo Process, and in
particular during Camp David and its aftermath”.103
This briefing is obviously something of a first version of Malley’s
later essay in the New York Review of Books as published in August
2001. In Ramallah, however, Malley focused on his criticism of
the Palestinian negotiators during the Oslo years in general and
Camp David in particular. For our purposes here, the content of the
briefing is not the main aspect. What is relevant here is the fact that
someone stood up and pointed unequivocally to the problem of
conflicting interpretations, i.e. at least indirectly to the spin and the
consequent production of the Myth of Camp David? There seems
to have been some direct response to this intervention by Malley
right in the center of the Palestinian Authority.
Only one month after Malley’s paper in Ramallah, we find the first
clear and direct Palestinian response to the Myth of Camp David,
which by then had taken hold of the United States and there above
all the Congress and the White House. In an attempt to salvage
what could still be salvaged Yasser Abed Rabbo sent a letter to the
American Congress in the name of the PLO Negotiations
Department in response to a letter the Congress had only shortly
103
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before sent to the new American President George W. Bush, asking
him to reassess the relationship of the U.S. with the Palestinians.
In this letter, the Palestinian side is finally and in all detail
presenting what happened at Camp David, in a clear attempt to
counter every single part of the Myth of Camp David.104 The
importance of this letter can therefore not be overestimated. In
July 2001, finally, everybody was able to access on the website
of the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department a FAQ under the
title “Camp David Peace Proposal: Frequently Asked Questions”
in three languages; English, Hebrew and Arabic.105
This paper clarified the main arguments concerning the Palestinian
position taken in Camp David point for point in a very clear and
convincing way. There is no more time or space for me to quote
these fully. They can be read, however, by anyone interested, both
on the website or in the JPS.
Conclusion:
This FAQ, however, just as Yasser Abed Rabbo’s letter to the
Congress, came almost one year late. Hardly anybody listened to
it any more. Rather, the Myth of Camp David seems to have taken
hold by then.
This deplorable state of affairs, against the background of the
deteriorating conditions in Israel and Palestine in the context of
the Intifada, seems to have provided the motive for Malley/Agha
and Sontag, to press ahead with their attempt to attack the Myth
of Camp David. Malley/Agha in particular focus on the perceived
inability of the Palestinian side to counter the Israeli/American
spin and media blitz which created the myth in the first place.
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“Much as they tried, the Palestinian leaders have proved
utterly unable to make their case. In Israel and the U.S.,
they are constantly depicted as uncompromising and
incapable of responding to Barak’s supreme effort. Yet,
in their own eyes, they were the ones who made the
principal concessions”.106
Furthermore, almost as an answer to this argument one can read
Deborah Sontag in the New York Times on July 26, 2001:
“Mr. Barak did not offer Mr. Arafat the moon at Camp
David. He broke Israeli taboos against any discussion
of dividing Jerusalem, and he sketched out an offer
that was politically courageous, especially for an
Israeli leader with a faltering coalition. But it was a
proposal that the Palestinians did not believe would
leave them with a viable state. And although Mr. Barak
said no Israeli leader could go further, he himself
improved considerably on his Camp David proposal
six months later”.107
The interventions by Deborah Sontag in the New York Times,
then by Malley and Agha in the New York Review of Books,
and finally also the public stand taken by Palestinians, above
all the Negotiation’s Department, resulted in a temporary
respite. The world press was full of renewed discussions of
Camp David. Many people had second thoughts, not only on
Camp David, but also on the Intifada and on developments
on the ground in Palestine/Israel. From now on, there are two
versions that had to be taken into consideration, the myth or,
in neutral terms, the “orthodox” version by Barak and Clinton,
and the revisionist one by Malley/Agha and others, not least
the Palestinians.
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Unfortunately, however, the pattern in the reception of both the
orthodox version and the revisionist one seems to have gone along
the lines of a separation between the academic, largely revisionist,
and the political - largely orthodox discourse, and it is replicated
in the sense, that on the level of political leaders in the West, the
orthodox version seems to have remained the hegemonic one,
while on the street at least there is some advance of the revisionist
version to be observed, with some inroads made also in the
international press.
To conclude with a first attempt of an interpretation, it seems to
me that there clearly was a first crucial time-period, approximately
July/August/September 2000, in which the whole matter was still
largely open. Since the end of September/beginning of October,
however, the world focused on the Intifada and accepted widely
the Israeli/American Myth of Camp David as the underlying
argument.
The Palestinians had basically had one chance to intervene, in
these three crucial months, more precisely between the last week
of July and the last week of September, i.e. until Sharon’s Haram/
Temple Mount provocation. After that, this first round had been
squarely lost to Israel.
The Israelis had won it by convincing the world of the rightness
of their stand, although this was basically a colonial one,
characterized in every step by paternalistic and arrogant,
sometimes outright racist attitudes.108 They succeeded in achieving
this with a variety of different means.
First, they did not lose a minute in starting their media offensive,
with Ehud Barak taking the lead already in the United States, just
outside Camp David, not even waiting for the end of Bill Clinton’s
press conference.
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Back in Israel, a concerted effort was undertaken with a whole
array of government statements, communications addressed to
the United States as well as the world at large, articles in the Israeli
press, research papers by pro-Israeli and Israeli think-tanks and
academia in Israel, all aiming at the same direction and providing
the world with a seemingly unassailable “possession of the truth”.
While all these activities were on the one hand, undertaken
separately and to a degree independently, with independent effects,
they were, on the other hand, assembled together on the official
Israeli website, exerting an additional impact on this level.
Second, in terms of content and form, the Israeli media blitz was
always on the offensive, never presenting itself in a defensive
manner. This seemingly left no option for the Palestinians but to
take a defensive stand, which they did for almost one whole year
(to some degree with the exception of Akram Hanieh’s Camp
David Papers, which did not make it, however, into the
international press, and therefore did not leave any real impact).
Finally, Israel used a very simple, but all the more effective tactics:
to repeat their stand again and again, irrespective of how credible
it was, until everybody had become convinced that this was the
truth and nothing but the truth.
On the other hand, my admittedly limited research in this matter
did come up with an impressive effort on the Palestinian side, to
make their stand known, locally, regionally and internationally.
However, it still was far from enough, and it still could not compete
with the well-oiled and well-established Israeli propaganda-
machine. Suffice it to present a very small but indicative
comparison: The Website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
gets about 350 to 400 000 visitors a week, while Miftah, Hanan
Ashrawi’s website in Jerusalem/Ramallah has had so far altogether
620 000 visitors, i.e. less than the Israeli F.M. received between
the first and the 14th of August 2003 (about 950 000).
When George W. Bush took over the presidency in Washington,
Palestinians made, together with international or more precisely
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American writers, a second attempt to make their voice heard.
They did succeed to a certain degree. However, by then the myth
had been established, was there, and it seems, was there to remain.
I think it is relevant in this context to quote a small passage from
on article placed on the website of Israeli newspaper Haaretz in
August 2003, as it is another shocking proof of how alive, well
and above all effective the Myth of Camp David is until today:
“The peace process will die if the P.A. does not remove Yasir
Arafat from all positions of influence”, Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon said in an interview published Wednesday in the French
daily Le Figaro, Israel Radio reported. Sharon also called for
cutting Arafat off from having any say over the PA’s finances.
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz also had harsh words for Arafat
on Wednesday, saying that the PA Chairman was doing everything
in his power to undermine current peace efforts and that Israel
would not continue with these efforts unless the PA dismantles
terrorist organizations, Israel Radio reported.
“I won’t be surprised if Arafat is behind the terror attacks in recent
days... He is doing all he can to torpedo the peace process and
Abu Mazen’s leadership...”.109
I should like to conclude with the following questions:
Was there in July/August/September 2000 an alternative
for the Palestinians in the sense that they could have
reacted to the spin and possibly prevented the myth-
production, or at least held their own narrative on an equal
level against it?
Did they have a realistic chance to enter the public arena
at the end of July 2000, when the spin was started and
thereby prevent the production of the myth?
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What was preventing them from taking up the gauntlet
thrown by Barak and Clinton and then the Israeli
propaganda machine?
While we all know the existing balance of power, I should like to
argue that especially against the background of this negative
balance for the Palestinians, it is absolutely necessary to grasp
every single chance to move things in their favor. Today, in the
age of globalization with the central role the global media play in
this context, the questions I proposed for discussion should be
addressed sooner rather than later, not least in the interest of
achieving the goals Palestinians have wanted to achieve for so
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The Political and Scientific Relevance of the
Failed Camp David and Taba Negotiations
Martin Beck*
Only recently, two years after their failure, the negotiations of
Camp David and Taba have become a major subject of scientific
research. This recent interest of the research community was
preceded by a public debate focusing on political rather than
scientific questions. Politicians and journalists primarily discussed
the normative dimension of who is to blame for the failure of the
negotiations. As described by Helga Baumgarten in detail, it took
only a few months before a clear majority of commentators came
to the definite conclusion that Yasir Arafat could be held
responsible for the negative outcome.
I believe that the original contribution of the scientific community
to the debate on the failure of Camp David and Taba should finally
redirect attention from a normative to an explanatory perspective,
attempting to answer the basic question: why the negotiations of
Camp David and Taba and the Oslo Peace Process as a whole
failed. A satisfactory answer to this question would require
broadening the horizon first, by putting the negotiations of Camp
David and Taba in the context of the Oslo Peace Process as a
whole, and second, by using the theoretical insights offered by
conflict theories as a tool to be applied to the present case.
Although the scientific community does not yet enjoy the
privileged position of knowing all facts necessary for a final
assessment of Camp David and Taba, there are some good reasons
to assume that, given the Israeli and Palestinian preferences,
nobody is to blame for the failure of Oslo. Based on an analysis
of the positions presented by Israel and the PLO in the course of
* Visiting Associate Professor, Birzeit University.
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the negotiations held in Camp David, Helga Baumgarten confirms
this view by stating that “A sober assessment of the summit would
conclude that the problems were extremely difficult given the
demands of both sides (...)” (emphasis added, M.B.).
The long history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is full of
failures.1 Negotiation theories, which among other things cover
the normative problem of whom to blame for failed negotiations,
face severe problems to contribute to an explanation of this
history. The reason behind this is that discussing preferences is
beyond the scope of mainstream negotiation theories, which
assumes that preferences are (normally) prior to negotiations
and are hardly subject to change in their course. Well, Oran
Young’s interesting concept challenges this mainstream opinion
by arguing that actors of negotiations in many cases only have
loose preferences. Thus, due to a “veil of uncertainty”,
preferences indeed can be changed during negotiations as a result
of communication, thereby opening a window of opportunity
for an agreement not perceived by the actors prior to the
negotiations.2 However, due to the long-lasting history of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and negotiations, it is not plausible
to assume that the actors of Camp David and Taba were not well
aware of their own positions as well as the adversary’s
preferences and its limits of flexibility.
Thus, the genuine scientific contribution to the failure of Camp
David and Taba should consist of answering the basic questions
of what obstacles prevented the actors to establish the framework
for peace prior to the negotiations of Camp David and Taba.
Besides a precise definition of the nature of the conflict and its
1
 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg/Neil Caplan: Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace. Patterns,
Problems, Possibilities, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998.
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situation structure, hurdles to peace both on the international and
the national level of the two actors should be examined in a
systematic way.3
Helga Baumgarten is not at all to blame that she does not cover
these basic questions. On the contrary, since political science
cannot ignore political debates prior to scientific research, a first
major task of scientists is indeed to shed light on major political
debates. Due to the political relevance of the normative debate on
whom to blame for the failure of the negotiations of Camp David
and Taba, the classical task of a historian to clarify facts is an
extremely important assignment. Thus, in a first step, Helga
Baumgarten describes “what actually happened in Camp David”
and Taba. Due to the lack of official documents, she faces a severe
methodological problem, which she attempts to solve by basing
her thorough analysis on Palestinian, American and Israeli
narratives. Thus, she presents evidence that what happened in
Camp David and Taba is not compatible with the dominant public
perception as nicely summarized by Deborah Sontag in one of
the first critical articles on Camp David: “Mr. Barak offered Mr.
Arafat the moon at Camp David (...). Mr. Arafat turned it down,
and then ‘pushed the button’ and chose the path of violence.”4 In
a logical second step, Helga Baumgarten attempts to deconstruct
this dominant perception as the “myth of Camp David”, thereby
explicitly attacking the Palestinian leadership for having failed to
“effectively counter the myth of Camp David”.
When Helga Baumgarten takes the first step of her approach, she
proves to be a solid historian. When she takes the second step,
she slips into the role of a critical political scientist. Her second
task is insofar more ambitious, posing an extremely demanding
3
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methodological challenge as she puts a contra-factual question.
Thus, since we lack the chance of an experiment, the results of
the second part of her paper might trigger more controversial
discussions.
Helga Baumgarten’s answer to the question why the Palestinian
side lost the “blame game” against Israel is divided in two parts.
First, contrary to Yasir Arafat who remained fairly passive, the
Israelis under the leadership of Ehud Barak “did not lose a minute
(...) in starting their media offensive”. Second, Israel managed to
always be “on the offensive”, whereas the Palestinians took a
“defensive stand”. Helga Baumgarten convincingly describes the
means and tools used by Israel in order to win the public campaign.
Yet, when she blames not only Yasir Arafat for his passivity, but
also other members of the Palestinian leadership, who participated
in the media debate, for their strategic mistakes, alternative
viewpoints could be taken. Helga Baumgarten’s argument against
Saeb Erakat’s “well-argued” contribution is that rather than “a
polite and considerate statement”, a “counter-attack against Barak”
was missing. Although this interesting and refreshing perspective
sheds new light on the discussion, it may be questionable whether
this statement is really fair. The same is true when Baumgarten
blames Hanan Ashrawi that “she too, however, apparently did
not perceive the dangers coming from the Clinton Barak press
campaign (...) and therefore did not even attempt to counter the
spin”. Anyway, due to the counter-factual nature of the question
posed by Helga Baumgarten, it is very difficult to decide such a
debate in a scientific way. Let us assume for a moment that the
two politicians criticized by Baumgarten would have done what
she expected them to do, namely to play the blame game by coming
up with a “direct and also angry Palestinian response” to Barak
and Clinton. Furthermore, let us assume that, despite such an
action, the Palestinians would have lost the blame game. In this
case, one could argue that it was a strategic mistake of the
Palestinian side to get involved in the blame game instead of
arguing that, in the words of Erakat, “it is pointless to play the
blame game or resort to prophecies of doom and gloom. No one
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is at fault because there was no failure. We made real progress at
Camp David and the imperative now is to build on that progress
and keep the momentum going.”5 Such an interpretation could
claim the same degree of plausibility as the one presented by Helga
Baumgarten, especially since she gives some evidence that Bill
Clinton’s support for Barak, coupled with Israel’s privileged access
to international mass media, plus Arafat’s passivity, left the
Palestinian side with few chances to win the media campaign
regardless of which strategy would have been taken.
In order to come closer to an answer of the very complicated
question why the Israeli side managed to take some benefits of
the failed negotiation process, whereas the Palestinian leadership
was more or less paralyzed, one should start with one or several
theoretical insights, testing whether they can help to solve the
puzzle. One approach of this kind to be discussed here briefly
starts with the widely accepted theorem that democracies are
superior to authoritarian regimes in terms of political effectiveness.
Keeping in mind that, due to a severe power asymmetry on the
international level, the Palestinian side was anyway at the
disadvantage vis-à-vis Israel; such an approach may provide us
with at least three important insights. First, as covered by Helga
Baumgarten, although the failure of Camp David and Taba was a
major blow to the political career of Barak and Arafat alike, only
the former showed some leadership quality by playing the blame
game, whereas Arafat remained passive. Instead of facing the
difficult situation, he arrogantly declared that those who do not
like “independence for our state with Jerusalem as its capital”
might “just as well drink the waters of the Dead Sea”.6 Second,
the Israeli government paved the road for a major policy change
by declaring the achieved progress in Camp David and Taba for
null and void. Barak obviously did so in order to give utmost
5
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flexibility to any future Israeli government to exert its superior
power capabilities against the Palestinian Authority and the
Palestinian people. Third, although Barak won the “blame game”
on the international level, he had to pay a high price for the failure
of Camp David and Taba on the national stage. The Israeli people
forced Barak to take political responsibility for the failure of the
Oslo Peace Process by voting him out of office, whereas the
Palestinian system lacked the ability to adapt to the new situation
by producing a new coherent strategy and/or a fresh leadership.
Helga Baumgarten’s paper is a very important contribution to the
debate on the “blame game”. If her findings will be taken seriously
by the Palestinian, Israeli and international public and the scientific
community alike -and I strongly wish so-, this will add to a revision
of the orthodox history on Camp David and Taba.
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Palestinians and Myth Production in the
Context of Camp David
Suleiman Rabadi*
Dr. Helga Baumgarten in her article “The Myth of Camp David
or the Distortion of The Palestinian Narrative” stated by embarking
on achieving three objectives:
1- To examine what has actually happened in Camp David,
by reviewing the primary and secondary literature.
2- To trace the creation of the Israeli reading, the Myth of
Camp David, and the success of the Palestinians in
undermining this myth.
3- To provoke a discussion of the role of the spins of myth
creation, and of the media in major international conflicts.
I think in the three mentioned objectives, Dr. Baumgarten did an
excellent job in clarifying the three aforementioned issues, putting
things in perspective, explaining, in a rather detailed, sometimes
exhaustive, manner the relation between the three issues at hand.
The paper is a must reading to understand the process of blaming
the Palestinians for the failure of Camp David II, and how this
blame was transformed to a process of undermining the Palestinian
leadership. I am not going to discuss the details of the process for
they are rather self evident in the paper.
It was clear from the beginning that the paper was not an
assessment of Palestinian negotiation performance in Camp David,
or at least it was an undeclared positive assessment of Palestinian
performance, taking into consideration the pressures that the
Palestinians were facing, which was practiced by all the parties,
* Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies - Birzeit University.
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including the Arab World, and the biased international media.
Palestinians refused in the Camp David negotiations to succumb
to Israeli terms that were backed by the US Administration, which
necessitated the creation of the Camp David Myth by the Israelis
and the Americans.
What was the real focal point in the paper is the ability or lack
of it, on the Palestinian side to counter argue the Myth of Camp
David, that singled the Palestinians as the responsible party
to sabotaging any agreement, while the Israelis’ were portrayed
as the party who made painful concessions in that summit.
Dr. Baumgarten thinks that the Palestinians failed in exposing
the Myth of Camp David and were too late in counter arguing
the main assumptions of the myth. The three questions at the
end of the paper are quite important and are crucial in any
debate to assess the extent to which the Palestinians failed or
succeeded in their endeavor to explain to the world their point
of view.  I will attempt to tackle the raised questions, which
are: Could the Palestinian have reacted to the myth production
and prevented it?  Did the Palestinians have a realistic chance
in the public arena, the media and prevent the production of
the myth? What prevented them from taking up the gauntlet
thrown by Barak and Clinton and the Israeli (and also the
American) propaganda machines.
It goes without saying that the Palestinians lack the necessary
tools, infrastructure, and foremost real political support that
the Israeli side has internally and worldwide. This does not
mean that the Palestinians are excused in their incapability of
using the entire available resources in a more professional
and aggressive manner to explain their position to the world.
The Palestinians came a long way in that respect, but still,
much has to be done at the level of political vision and political
performance in order to be able to rise to the challenges that
they are facing. Influencing Western public opinion, or being
real players in the internal system of public opinion-making
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in the West requires pre-conditions that the Palestinians and
the Arabs do not possess, and due to the way things are
evolving after the 11th of September, one can’t see it happening
in the near future.
Myth Creation
The Israelis have mastered and perfected the profession of myth
creation, starting with the first Zionist congress up to date. The
Palestinians learned from this experience, and attempted in the
years since the establishment of the State of Israel to counter argue
Israeli myths, successful at times but unsuccessful most of the
times. The well-oiled and well-established Israeli propaganda-
machine, mentioned by Dr. Baumgarten, was able to situate itself
well at the organizational and political levels in the West and
especially in the USA. The Israeli narrative captured the minds
and hearts of the West, using to the utmost the Eurocentric/
Americana vision of the Judeo-Christian civilizations’ superiority
to all other civilizations as the suitable backdrop to any attempt at
dismantling the marriage of convenience and mutual interests that
existed between Israel and the West. Israel’s presence, through
the Jewish communities, in the internal political game, especially
in the US and to a lesser extent among the main European powers,
made it more difficult to achieve any success in that direction.
Palestinian, Arab and Muslim communities in the West were and
are disorganized and self-indulged rendering them unable to play
the same role the Jewish communities played in influencing the
internal political game, or in showing any real presence in the
media. What the Palestinian, Arab and Muslim communities have
been doing in the West is, either try to totally assimilate in these
societies, or isolate themselves in ghettos. In both cases, they can’t
be effective advocates of any Arab or Muslim cause.
In this situation, it is really unrealistic to ask the Palestinians to
create all these pre-conditions that are necessary to be able to
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influence the political game, the media and society at large with
no real foot soldiers to the work and a well-oiled infrastructure to
face myth creation in the different aspects perpetuated. In this
sense, Dr. Baumgarten has been reiterating the old unrealistic
dream, which was voiced by Edward Sai’d, Hisham Sharabi,
Ibrahim Abu Lughod, and others, of trying to gain ground in the
West at the political and cultural levels, like the Jewish
communities have done in the West. We have to admit that we
can’t do it, and stop tormenting and whipping ourselves for our
impotence vis-à-vis this issue. This does not mean that we have
to ignore this arena, and it does not mean that we are excused in
our unprofessional performance, but we have to be humble in our
goals, do our best and elevate the anti to a higher level.We have
to take into consideration the balance of power, and to downplay
our illusions about the West, and for that matter, the role of the
Arabs and Muslims in the West.
The hard core fact is that myth creation has and will always be
the tool of the powerful and the only way to dismantle myths is to
change the balance of power. It is important to counter argue
myths, but it is not enough; things have to change on the ground
to give power to the counter argument.  In that sense, the
Palestinian narrative can’t, in the foreseeable future, be at the same
level against the Camp David Myth or any other myths created
by Israel. Palestinians have to improve their performance and
timing and this task needs much work and less self-whipping.
Western Media and Public Opinion
It seems that Dr. Baumgarten is too optimistic about Western
media and Western public opinion. The American/British
invasion of Iraq, against the will of most of the world and the
United Nations, should yet teach us another lesson about the
role of the media and for that matter, Western public opinion.
The media is becoming less and less critical of governments,
especially when it has to do with international conflicts, and at
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the best quite shy in the name of ‘impartiality’. The media in the
US/ UK has actually played the role of the war Drummer,
perpetuating the myths about weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq. Public opinion has been active especially in UK but with
no real influence on stopping the war. When the war started,
everybody rallied behind the boys at the front. The media used
the most censored, sentimentalized sorry telling in the history
of modern coverage. We shouldn’t be surprised then that Western
media did not seek the real story of what had happened in Camp
David. Western media have joined the game of dividing the world
to good guys and bad guys (terrorists), and anybody who is
against the unholy US/UK alliance is earmarked as pro-terrorist.
The belief that the Palestinians should have done more is obvious
from the narrative in the paper, but I wouldn’t have given it the
weight that Dr. Baumgarten has given to it in effecting the public
opinion or Western attitude.
Did Palestinian Negotiators, Intentionally,
Stayed out of the Blame Game?
I wouldn’t be that optimistic about the suaveness or political
acuteness of Palestinian political leaders. The Palestinian
leadership itself, has a lot of illusions about the role of the United
States as a broker, about the Israeli political system Israeli Public
opinion and about the making of public opinion in the West. These
illusions have to be deconstructed in order to get out of the viscous
circle of the creation of Palestinian myths that are sometimes more
destructive than the myths created by Israeli propaganda machine.
The question to be posed is were the calculation of leadership
correct in trying to change the situation on the ground since they
were unable to match the Israeli and American propaganda
machine in the blame game.
The argument in the paper, although not explicit, would give a
positive answer to the previous question. In the section about
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the Intifada, Clinton parameters and the Taba conference, it is
argued that the changes in the Israeli and American positions,
although not long lasting, in their annulment after the Israeli
elections, the Taba conference came as a result of the Intifada
and what was happening on the ground. It did not come as a
result of a media blitz to counter argue the Isaeli/American Camp
David myth. As I said earlier, it is wishful thinking that the
Palestinians could win the war of media and perceptions, without
gaining on the ground. Maybe the illusions of the Palestinian
leadership have delayed their response to the myth creation, but
maybe their illusions this time played well in an intentional way,
and maybe Arafat’s tactics of changing the situation on the ground
were needed more than a media blitz, but the militarization of
the Intifada was the biggest sin that undermined any attempt to
achieve further gains on the ground.
Using the Myth to Change the Palestinian
Leadership
The most interesting part of the Camp David Myth is how it was
used to create an atmosphere that perpetuated the myth of the
inevitability of Palestinian violence and how the Palestinians
fell in the trap by militarizing the Intifada. The other interesting
aspect is the long term preparations of trying to create the pre-
conditions to undermine and eventually, dispose of the Palestinian
leadership as outlined in the paper. After Camp David II, the
Israelis and the Americans attempted systematically to set the
ground for an alternative Palestinian leadership by character
assassinating Arafat and depicting him as the cause of all evils.
I think these two issues are of utmost importance and should be
subjected to further discussion.
Changing the leadership to a village league style leadership
has been always an Israeli dream. The character assassination
of Arafat, which goes beyond Arafat persona, is to change the
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Palestinian leadership and substitute it with village league style
leadership in order to insure Palestinian signature on final status
issues that would be tailored according to Israeli vision and
considerations. For sure, major changes in the Palestinian
Political System, including the role of the presidency, should
take place, but it has to be as an outcome of internal political
debate and a drastic change in the whole political environment.
The problem is that neither the US nor Israel are really
concerned about a more democratic system in Palestine; they
just want a village league style leadership and a subservient
Palestinian population that would sign a treaty succumbing to
the Israeli conditions. I think they also have illusions that they
have to deal with.
Palestinians should rethink about their methods and tools of
fighting occupation, and the usefulness of these tools in creating
facts on the ground that would be instrumental in supporting any
negotiations. Media should be given more attention and a better
infrastructure should be in place. I think a demilitarized Intifada,
coupled with a better vision, better media coverage, and real
internal reforms could be instrumental in affecting international
politics than just engaging in the blame games.
